To be paired with a lightweight digital signing scheme of which the modulus length is between 80 and 160 bits, a new non-Merkle-Damgård structure (non-MDS) hash function is proposed by the authors based on a multivariate permutation problem (MPP) and an anomalous subset product problem (ASPP) to which no subexponential time solutions are found so far. It includes an initialization algorithm and a compression algorithm, and converts a short message of n bits treated as only a block into a digest of m bits, where 8 0 ≤ m ≤ 232 and 8 0 ≤ m ≤ n ≤ 4096. Analysis shows that the new hash is one-way, weakly collision-free, and strongly collision-free along with a proof, and its security against existent attacks such as birthday attack and meet-in-the-middle attack gets the O(2 m ) magnitude. Running time of its compression algorithm is analyzed to be O(nm 2 ) bit operations. A comparison with the Chaum-Heijst-Pfitzmann hash based on a discrete logarithm problem is made. Especially, the new hash with short input and small computation may be used to reform a classical hash with an m-bit output and an O(2 m/2 ) magnitude security into a compact hash with an m / 2-bit output and the same security. Thus, it opens a door to convenience for utilization of lightweight digital signing schemes.
Introduction
In recent years, the ECC-160 digital signing scheme, an analogue of the ElGamal digital signing scheme based on a discrete logarithm problem (DLP) in an elliptic curve group over a finite field [1] [2] , and some lightweight digital signing schemes -the optimized version of the REESSE1+ digital signing scheme [3] for example have been utilized for RF ID (Radio Frequency Identity) tags or non-RF ID tags [4] [5] [6] .
While a RF ID tag contains an IC chip which is used to store signatures and other data, an non-RF ID tag contains no IC chip because a short signature from a lightweight or ultra-lightweight signing scheme may be symbolized in short length, and printed directly on a papery tag or label. Now, such tags are applied to the identification, authentication, or anti-forgery of financial-notes, certificates, diplomas, and commodities, particularly including food and drug.
It is well understood that we first need to extract the digest of a message by employing a hash function before signing the message. Traditionally, a hash function consists of a compression function and the Merkle-Damgård structure (MDS) [7] [8] . Let ĥ be a hash function, and generally, it has the following four properties [9] [10]:
given a message , it is very easy to calculate the message digest ḏ = ĥ (), where ḏ is also called a hash output;
given a digest ḏ, it is very hard to calculate the message  according to ḏ = ĥ (), namely ĥ is one-way;
given any arbitrary message , it is computationally infeasible to find another message ′ such that ĥ() = ĥ(′), namely ĥ is weakly collision-free; it is computationally infeasible to find two arbitrary messages  ≠ ′ such that ĥ() = ĥ(′), namely ĥ is strongly collision-free. The word "infeasible" means that some problem cannot be solved at least in polynomial time. Sometimes, is optional with some users of a hash function because , , and are enough for most of applications of the users.
At present, SHA-1, SHA-256, and SHA-384 announced by NIST are among the hash functions that are believed to be secure [9] [11] though they each cannot resist birthday attack of which the time ) magnitude, where m is the bit-length of a message digest namely a hash output. It is well known that the output bit-lengths of these three functions are 160, 256, and 384 respectively.
When any of the three is practically paired with a lightweight signing scheme of which the modulus bit-length is between 80 and 160, its output must be adjusted to the range of the modulus bit-length of the singing scheme with its security unchanged or corresponding to the signing scheme.
The modulus bit-length of the optimized REESSE1+ signing scheme based on a transcendental logarithm problem and a polynomial root finding problem is 80 [3] , and its security is the 2 80 magnitude. When SHA-1 is paired with this signing scheme, the output of SHA-1 must be adjusted to 80 bits with its security unchanged. Again when SHA-256 is paired with ECC-160, the output of SHA-256 must be adjusted to 160 bits with its security being at least the 2 80 magnitude. Therefore, it is a problem in practice how to adjust a message digest from a classical hash function to the range of the modulus bit-length of a host signing scheme and to keep the security of the message digest being unchanged or corresponding to the host signing scheme.
To settle this problem, the authors design a new non-MDS hash function called JUNA which includes two algorithms: an initialization algorithm and a compression algorithm, converts a short message or a message digest of n bits into an output string of m bits, where 80 ≤ m ≤ 232 and 80 ≤ m ≤ n ≤ 4096, and moreover ensures that the security of the output string against collision attacks gets the O(2 m ) magnitude. This paper has two dominant novelties:
designing the initialization algorithm based on a multivariate permutation problem which only has an exponential time solution currently, and makes the new hash function be able to resist a birthday attack; designing the compression algorithm based on an anomalous subset product problem which also only has an exponential time solution currently, and makes the new hash function be able to resist other classical attacks, especially including a meet-in-the-middle attack. The significance of the paper lies in the thing that a new non-MDS hash function with an m-bit output and the O (2 m ) magnitude security is first proposed by the authors while a classical iterative hash function is with an m-bit output and only the O(2 m / 2 ) magnitude security. In Section 2 of the paper, several relevant definitions are given. In Section 3, the two algorithms of the new hash function are described. In Section 4, the security of the new hash function is analyzed. In Section 5, the running time of the compression algorithm of the new hash is dissected, a comparison with another non-MDS hash, the Chaum-Heijst-Pfitzmann hash based on a discrete logarithm problem, is made, and the reformation of a classical hash function is illustrated.
Throughout the paper, unless otherwise specified, an even number n ≥ 80 is the bit-length of a short message (a message digest) or the item-length of a sequence, the sign % denotes "modulo",  does "M -1" with M prime, lg x means a logarithm of x to the base 2, ¬b i does NOT operation of a bit b i , Þ does the maximal prime allowed in a coprime sequence, |x| does the absolute value of a number x, x does the order of x % M, S  does the size of a set S, and gcd(x, y) represents the greatest common divisor of two integers x and y. Without ambiguity, "% M " is usually omitted in expressions. Notice that (3) of this definition is slightly different from that in [3] . 
A Bit Shadow and a Bit Long-Shadow
On the other hand, there is ∑ n−k j=1 ḅy j = 0, where ḅy 1 , …, ḅy n − k are 0-bit shadows. In total, there is ∑ n i=1 ḅ i = n. Property 2: Let {A 1 , …, A n } be a coprime sequence, and ḅ 1 …ḅ n be the bit shadow string of b 1 …b n ≠ 0. Then the mapping from
ḅ i is one-to-one.
Proof:
Step 1. Let b 1 …b n and b′ 1 …b′ n be two different nonzero bit strings, and ḅ 1 …ḅ n and ḅ′ 1 …ḅ′ n be the two corresponding bit shadow strings.
If ḅ 1 …ḅ n = ḅ′ 1 …ḅ′ n , then by Definition 2, there is b 1 …b n = b′ 1 …b′ n . In addition, for any arbitrary bit shadow string ḅ 1 …ḅ n , there always exists a preimage b 1 …b n . Thus, the mapping from b 1 …b n to ḅ 1 …ḅ n is one-to-one.
Step 2.
Obviously the mapping from
Since {A 1 , …, A n } is a coprime sequence, and A i ḅ i either equals 1 with ḅ i = 0 or contains the same prime factors as those of A i with ḅ i ≠ 0, we can obtain
is in direct contradiction to ḅ 1 …ḅ n ≠ ḅ′ 1 …ḅ′ n . Therefore, the mapping from ḅ 1 …ḅ n to ∏ n i=1 A i ḅ i is injective [12] .
In summary, the mapping from ḅ 1 …ḅ n to ∏ n i=1 A i ḅ i is one-to-one, and further the mapping from b 1 …b n to ∏ n i=1 A i ḅ i is also one-to-one.
Definition 3:
Let ḅ 1 …ḅ n be the bit shadow string of b 1 …b n ≠ 0.
called a bit long-shadow, where
2(i -1) / n (n / 2) = 0 or 1. According to Definition 3, it is not difficult to understand that for every ḇ i , there is 0
For example, let b 1 …b 8 = 01010110, then ḇ 1 …ḇ 8 = 06020410. Fact 2: Let ḇ 1 …ḇ n be the bit long-shadow string of
By Definition 3 and Fact 1, we have ∑
If every b i = 1, namely every 
where
2(x -1) / n (n / 2) = 0 due to b x being the unique nonzero bit. Thus, it holds that n ≤ ∑ n i=1 ḇ i ≤ 2n. Property 3: Let ḇ 1 …ḇ n be the bit long-shadow string of b 1 …b n ≠ 0. Then the mapping from b 1 …b n to ḇ 1 …ḇ n is one-to-one.
Proof:
On one hand, assume that a bit string b 1 …b n ≠ 0 is known.
It is understood from Definition 3 that
Because when b 1 …b n is known, ḅ 1 …ḅ n and  1 … n are respectively determined, ḇ 1 …ḇ n can also be determined uniquely.
On the other hand, assume that a bit long-shadow string ḇ 1 …ḇ n is known. According to ḇ i = ḅ i 2  i and ḇ i = 0 with ḅ i = 0, where
2(i -1) / n (n / 2) , we can determinate b i for i = 1, …, n as follows.
Case of ḇ i = 0 If ḇ i = 0, then ḅ i = 0, and set b i = 0. Case of ḇ i ≠ 0 If ḇ i ≠ 0, then ḅ i ≠ 0, and set b i = 1. In this way, the value of every b i can be determined uniquely. In summary, the mapping from b 1 …b n to ḇ 1 …ḇ n is one-to-one.
A Lever Function
The designing of the initialization algorithm of the new hash function is based on the hard problem
δ (% M) for i = 1, …, n which is first used for the REESSE1+ asymmetric cryptosystem, where the exponent ℓ(i) is called a lever function [3] .
In the paper, we still borrow the concept of the lever function but a public key is regarded as an initial value, and a private key (parameter) is only used for the generation of the initial value, not for decryption.
Definition 4: The secret parameter ℓ(i) in the transform of a non-MDS hash function is called a lever function, if it has the following features: ℓ(.) is an injection from the domain {1, …, n} to the codomain Ω ⊂ {5, …, }, where  is large; the mapping between i and ℓ(i) is established randomly without an analytical expression; an attacker has to be faced with all the permutations of elements in Ω when inferring a related private parameter from an initial value; the owner of the private parameter only need to consider the polynomial arithmetic of elements in Ω when doing a certain computation.
Feature and make it clear that if n is large enough, it is infeasible for the attacker to search all the permutations of elements in Ω exhaustively while the computation by the owner of the private parameter is feasible in polynomial time in n. Thus, the amount of calculation on ℓ(.) is large at "a public terminal", and is small at "a private terminal".
Notice that the number of all the elements of Ω, namely the size of Ω is not less than n. Property 4 (Indeterminacy of ℓ(.)): Let δ = 1 and
and
Proof:
It is easy to understand that W
Let Ō d be an oracle on solving a discrete logarithm problem.
In light of group theories, ∀ A′ z ∈ {2, …, Þ}, the congruence
, and let 
Design of the New Non-MDS Hash Function
The Chaum-Heijst-Pfitzmann hash function, a non-MDS one, is appreciable. It is based on a discrete logarithm problem, and proved to be strongly collision-free [16] .
The new non-MDS hash function is composed of two algorithms which contain two main parameters m and n, where m denotes the bit-length of a modulus used in the new hash, n denotes the bit-length of a short message or a message digest from a classical hash function, and there are 80 ≤ m ≤ 232 with 80 ≤ m ≤ n ≤ 4096. For example, as m = 80 ≤ n, there should be Λ = 2 10 and Ω  = n; as m = 96 ≤ n, should Λ = 2 12 and Ω  = n; as m = 112 ≤ n, should Λ = 2 14 and Ω  = n; as m = 128 ≤ n, should Λ = 2 16 and Ω  = 2 12 ; as m = 232 ≤ n, should Λ = 2 32 and Ω  = 2 32 . Notice that in the arithmetic modulo , −x represents  -x.
Initialization Algorithm
This algorithm is employed by an authoritative third party or the owner of a key pair, and only needs to be executed one time.
INPUT S2: Find a prime M with lg M = m such that  / 2 is a prime, or the least prime factor of  / 2 > 4n(2ñ + 3).
Because of  / 2 = a prime or the least prime factor of  / 2 > 4n(2ñ + 3), the probability that the case W
, where g is a generator of ( * M , ·) obtained through Algorithm 4.80 in Section 4.6 of [9] , and F < 2 lg Þ is a factor of .
At S4, Ω = {+/−5, +/−7, …, +/−(2ñ + 3)} indicates that Ω is one of 2 ñ potential sets, indeterminate, and unknown to the public, where "+/−" means the selection of the "+" or "−" sign.
with A i ∈ {2, 3, …, Þ | 10 ≤ lg Þ ≤ 32} and ℓ(i) ∈ {+/−5, +/−7, …, +/−(2ñ + 3) | n ≤ ñ ≤ 2 32 } for i = 1, …, n is referred to as a multivariate permutation problem, shortly MPP [3] .
n is computationally at least equivalent to the DLP in the same prime field. See Section 4.1 for its proof.
Compression Algorithm
This algorithm is employed by a person who wants to obtain a short message digest.
INPUT: an initial value ({C 1 , …, C n }, M), where lg M = m with 80 ≤ m ≤ n ≤ 4096; a short message (or a message digest from a classical hash function)
It is easily known from Definition 3 that the max of {ḇ 1 , …, ḇ n } is less than or equal to n when
2(i -1) / n (n / 2) and ḅ i being a bit shadow is referred to as an anomalous subset product problem, shortly ASPP [3] .
2(i -1) / n (n / 2) and ḅ i being a bit shadow is computationally at least equivalent to the DLP in the same prime field.
See Section 4.3 for its proof.
Security Analysis of the New Non-MDS Hash Function
Because a hash function must be one-way, weakly collision-free, and sometimes required to be strongly collision-free, the new non-MDS hash function should also be at least one-way and weakly collision-free.
It is should be noted that lg M = m, but not n, is the security dominant parameter of the new non-MDS hash function.
Definition 7: Let A and B be two computational problems. A is said to reduce to B in polynomial time, written as A ≤ P T B, if there is an algorithm for solving Α which calls, as a subroutine, a hypothetical algorithm for solving B, and runs in polynomial time, excluding the time of the algorithm for solving B [9] [17] .
The hypothetical algorithm for solving B is called an oracle. It is easy to understand that no matter what the time complexity of the oracle is, it does not influence the result of the comparison.
A ≤ P T B means that the difficulty of A is not greater than that of B, namely the time complexity of the fastest algorithm for solving A is not greater than that of the fastest algorithm for solving B when all polynomial times are treated as the identical magnitude. Concretely speaking, if A cannot be solved in polynomial or subexponential time, correspondingly B cannot also be solved in polynomial or subexponential time; and if B can be solved in polynomial or subexponential time, correspondingly A can also be solved in polynomial or subexponential time. [17] . A = P T B means that either if A is a intractability with a certain complexity on a condition that its dominant variable approaches a large number, B is also a intractability with the same complexity on the identical condition; or both A and B can be solved in linear or polynomial time.
Obviously, Definition 7 and 8 gives a partial order relation among the complexities or difficulties of computational problems [18] , and suggest a reductive proof method called polynomial time Turing reduction (PTR) [17] .
In addition, for convenience sake, let Ĥ(y = f(x)) represent the complexity or difficulty of the problem of solving y = f(x) for x [19] .
Proof of Property 5
In Section 3.1, the MPP is defined as
What follows is the proof of Property 5, a property of the MPP.
Proof:
} is a constant.
Let
where g ∈ * M be a generator. Then, there is
The above expression corresponds to the fact that in the ElGamal cryptosystem where many users share the modulus and a key generator, User 1 acquires a private key z 1 and a public key C 1 , …, and User n acquires a private key z n and a public key C n . It is well known that in this case, the attack of an adversary is still faced with the DLP, namely seeking z i from the simultaneous equation
for i = 1, …, n is computationally equivalent to the DLP [9] . Thus, when every g i is weakened to a constant, seeking δ from C i ≡ g i δ (% M) for i = 1, …, n is computationally equivalent to the DLP, which indicates that when every g i is not a constant, seeking g i and δ from C i ≡ g i δ (% M) for i = 1, …, n is computationally at least equivalent to the DLP. Secondly, singly consider a certain C i , where the subscript i is designated.
for g i and δ, where i is in {1, …, n}, and Ṟ is a constraint on g i such that the original g i and δ can be found.
Let y ≡ g x (% M) be of the DLP. Then, by calling Ō m (y, M, g), x can be obtained. According to Definition 7, there is
which indicates that when only a certain g i is known, seeking g i and δ from C i ≡ g i δ (% M) is computationally at least equivalent to the DLP.
Integrally, seeking the original {A i }, {ℓ(i)}, W, and δ from
n is computationally at least equivalent to the DLP in the same prime field.
Security of the Initialization Algorithm
Clearly, the security of the initialization algorithm depends on the security of the MPP
In [3] , we analyze the security of the MPP
and ℓ(i) ∈ {5, 7, …, (2n + 3)} for i = 1, …, n from the three aspects, discover no subexponential time solution to it, and contrarily, find some evidence which inclines people to believe that the MPP is computationally harder than the DLP.
Considering that the set Ω is different from the old in [3] , and the range of Þ is larger than the old in [3] , we will analyze the security of the MPP with different restrictions additionally. Adversaries may try to eliminate W through judging ℓ( 
Ineffectualness of Presupposing
where g is a generator of (
Notice that the number of non-repeated values of δ will be less than 2 m . In succession, need to seek W. Now, the most effectual approach to seeking W is that for every i, the adversaries fix a value of δ, divine A i and ℓ(i), and find the set  i according to
where  i is the set of possible values of W meeting
, …, W n ∈  n being pairwise equal, the divination of δ, {A i }, and {ℓ(i)} is thought right; else fix another value of δ, repeat the above process.
Notice that due to  / 2 = a prime or the least prime factor of  / 2 > 4n(2ñ + 3), W
can be solved in polynomial time, and besides letting W = g µ % M is unnecessary.
It is not difficulty to understand that the size of every  i is about (2Ω )Λ.
In summary, the time complexity of the above attack task is 
Ineffectualness of Guessing W
Owing to 80 ≤ lgM ≤ 232,  can be factorized in tolerable subexponential time, and further a value of W can be guessed.
Adversaries may try to eliminate W through W
Raising either side of every equation
Suppose that the value of every A i ∈ Λ = {2, 3, …, Þ | 10 ≤ lgÞ ≤ 32} is guessed, or the possible values of every A i are traversed.
, where g is a generator of (
Notice that u i ≠ v i δ (%  ), and {v 1 , …, v n } is not a super increasing sequence.
The above congruence is seemingly the MH transform [20] . Actually, {v 1 W , …, v n W} is not a super increasing sequence, and moreover there is not necessarily lg (u i W ) = lg .
Because v i W  ∈ [1,  ] is stochastic, the inverse δ -1 %  not need be close to the minimum  / (u i W ), 2 / (u i W ), …, or (u i W  -1) / (u i W ). Namely δ -1 may lie at any integral position of the interval [k / (u i W ), (k + 1) / (u i W )], where k = 0, 1, …, u i W  -1, which illustrates that the accumulation points of minima do not exist. Further observing, in this case, when i traverses the interval [2, n] , the number of intersections of the intervals containing δ -1 is likely the max of {u 1 W , …, u n W } which is promisingly close to . Therefore, the Shamir attack by the accumulation point of minima is fully ineffectual [21] .
Even if find out δ -1 through the Shamir attack method, because each of { v 1 , …, v n } has W solutions, the number of potential sequences {g v 1 , …, g v n } is up to W  n . Because of needing to verify whether {g v 1 , …, g v n } is a coprime sequence for each different sequence {v 1 , …, v n }, the number of possible coprime sequences is in proportion to W  n . Hence, the initial {A 1 , …, A n } cannot be determined in subexponential time. Further, the value of W cannot be computed, and the values of W  and δ -1 cannot be verified, which indicates that the MPP can also be resistant to the Shamir attack by the accumulation point of minima.
Additionally, the adversaries may divine the value of A i in about O(Λ) time with i ∈ [1, n], and compute δ by v i W  ≡ u i W  δ (%  ). However, because of W  | , the equation will have W  solutions. Therefore, the time complexity of finding the original δ is at least 
Proof of Property 6
In Section 3.2, the ASPP is defined as
and ḅ i being a bit shadow. What follows is the proof of Property 6, a property of the ASPP. Proof:
is the bit long-shadow string of b 1 …b n . Particularly, when
with 0 ≤ ḇ i ≤ n, and define the corresponding oracle as Ō a (ḏ,
Since there is 0 ≤ b i ≤ ḇ i , and the mapping from ḇ 1 …ḇ n to b 1 …b n is one-to-one, by calling Ō a (Ḡ 1 , C 1 , …, C n , M), we can find b 1 …b n .
By Definition 7, there is
Ĥ(Ḡ 1 ≡ ∏ n i=1 C i b i (% M)) ≤ P T Ĥ(ḏ ≡ ∏ n i=1 C i ḇ i (% M)).
By Property 5 in [3], there is
Further, by transitivity, there is
for ḇ 1 …ḇ n is at least equivalent to the DLP in the same prime field in computational complexity.
Security of the Compression Algorithm
The compression algorithm of which the input message is treated as only a block is the main body of the new non-MDS hash function, and thus, through it the four natural properties of the new hash function are embodied dominantly.
Clearly, the security of the compression algorithm depends on the security of the
2(i -1) / n (n / 2) and ḅ i being a bit shadow. In [3] , we analyze the security of the ASPP Ḡ ≡ ∏ n i=1 C i ḅ i (% M) from the three aspects, discover no subexponential time solution to it, and contrarily, find some evidence which inclines people to believe
is computationally harder than the DLP. Due to 
Compression Algorithm Is Computationally One-way
, which is called an anomalous subset sum problem, shortly ASSP [3] , and computationally at least equivalent to a subset sum problem (SSP) due to
The SSP has been proved to be NP-complete in its feasibility recognition form, and its computational version, especially the high-density or big-length version, is NP-hard [9] [24] . Hence, solving ASSP is at least NP-hard.
Moreover in the non-MDS hash function, there is n ≥ m = lg M and n ≥ ḇ i ≥ b i ∈ [0, 1]. The knapsack density relevant to the ASSP
lg n / lg M = n lg n / m > lg n > 1, which means that there exists many solutions to ḇ 1 u 1 + … + ḇ n u n ≡ v (%  ), namely the original solution cannot be determined, or will not occur in a reduced lattice base defined by LLL [25] . Notice that only such a 〈ḇ 1 , …, ḇ n 〉 from which a right bit string can be deduced will be a reasonable solution vector. Experiments show that when D > 1, the probability that the original solution or a reasonable solution is found through LLL lattice base reduction is almost zero [26] .
Hence, LLL lattice base reduction attack on ASSP [25] [27] is utterly ineffectual, which illustrates that even although a DLP with the modulus bit-length less than 1024 can be solved, the original or a reasonable ḇ 1 …ḇ n cannot be found yet in DLP subexponential time,
computationally one-way.
Compression Algorithm Is Weakly Collision-free
Assume that b 1 …b n ≠ 0 is a short message or a message digest from a classical hash function. By Definition 3, we easily understand that
Given a short message b 1 …b n ≠ 0, and let b′ 1 …b′ n ≠ 0 be another short message to need to be found. Let ḇ 1 …ḇ n be the bit long-shadow string of b 1 …b n , and ḇ′ 1 …ḇ′ n be the bit long-shadow string of b′ 1 …b′ n .
Let lĥ be the compression algorithm of the new non-MDS hash function described in Section 3.2. Hence, we have
2(i -1) / n (n / 2) , and
Observe an extreme case.
Owing to the max of 0
Under the circumstances, if
. We need to solve the above equation for z′. If the order C is known, let z′ = z + kC, where k ≥ 1 is an integer. Once a fit k is found, there will be C z ≡ C z ′ (% M), and a bit string can be inferred from ḇ′ 1 …ḇ′ n . However, seeking C is of the integer factorization problem (IFP) at present because the prime factors of  must be known.
In practice, C 1 , …, C n that are produced through the algorithm in Section 3.1 are pairwise unequal, which implies that for any given short message b 1 …b n , seeking another short message b′ 1 …b′ n such that
is harder than the IFP in computational complexity, namely b′ 1 …b′ n for lĥ(b 1 …b n ) = lĥ(b′ 1 …b′ n ) cannot be found in IFP subexponential time. Therefore, we say that the new non-MDS hash function is weakly collision-free. Again because the new hash function is non-MDS, and based on the intractabilities, like the Chaum-Heijst-Pfitzmann hash function, it is resistant to single-block differential attack [28] .
Compression Algorithm Is Resistant to Birthday Attack
First, observe an example of whether any two students in a class have the same birthday. Suppose that the class has 23 students. If a teacher specifies a day (say February 12), then the chance that at least one student is born on that day is (1 -(364 / 365) 23 ) ≈ 6.11 %. However, the probability that at least one student has the same birthday as any other student is around (1 -(365×…×343 / 365   23 )) ≈ 50.73 %, which prompts birthday attack on hash functions.
Birthday attack is widely exploited for finding any two messages  and ′ such that ĥ() = ĥ(′), namely (, ′) is a collision, where ĥ is a hash function [29] . If the bit-length of a message digest is m, an adversary can find a collision (, ′) such that ĥ() = ĥ(′) with probability 50% in roughly 1.1774 × 2 m / 2 time, namely with input of 1.1774 × 2 m / 2 random messages [30] . However, to the new non-MDS hash, a collision is transformed into a mapping. Theorem 1: The new non-MDS hash function is resistant to birthday attack on the assumption that the MPP and ASPP have only exponential time solutions.
Proof: Let b 1 …b n and b′ 1 …b′ n be two arbitrary different short messages, and ḇ 1 …ḇ n and ḇ′ 1 …ḇ′ n be two related bit long-shadow strings.
Suppose
. Because the ASPP has only exponential time solutions, we cannot directly
and ḵ − ḵ ′ < 4n(2ñ + 3). Raising either side of the above congruence to the δ -1 -th power yields
Due to  / 2 = a prime or the least prime factor of  / 2 > 4n(2ñ + 3), there is
where k ∈ [0, 46) is a small integer, (ḵ − ḵ ′) / 2 k is a prime, and W ∈ (1,  ) as a component of a private key is determinate, which manifests that if ḇ 1 …ḇ n and ḇ′ 1 …ḇ′ n satisfy (1), there will be ḏ = ḏ ′.
For clear explanation, (1) is written as the form of a function:
Since  contains only one 2-factor, (2) has only two solutions when k ≠ 0.
In other words, we may define a mapping from {0, 1} n × {0, 1} n to {1, …, }:
n , the probability that Ψ (b 1 …b n , b′ 1 …b′ n ) = W 2 k is nearly 1 /2 m . Further, let ṉ be the number of needed inputs (b 1 …b n , b′ 1 …b′ n )′s to find at least a (b 1 …b n , b′ 1 …b′ n ) such that Ψ (b 1 …b n , b′ 1 …b′ n ) = W 2 k with probability 50%, which is equivalent to finding any two messages b 1 …b n and b′ 1 …b′ n such that lĥ(b 1 …b n ) = lĥ(b′ 1 …b′ n ) with probability 50%. Then ṉ satisfies 1 -((2 m -k)/2 m ) ṉ = 50%. Through computation, find that ṉ is nearly 2 m -1 with k ∈ [0, 46).
The 2 m -1 is far larger than the threshold 1.1774 × 2 m / 2 for the effective birthday attack. The reason is that a hidden restriction is imposed on the input (b 1 …b n , b′ 1 …b′ n ), which is easily understood as the number of students of the class needs to be increased for finding with probability 50% any two students who have both the same birthday and the same gender. Additionally, because a private key ({A i }, {ℓ(i)}, W, δ) is unknown for the adversary, and the MPP is intractable, it is also infeasible that the adversary finds specific b 1 …b n and b′ 1 …b′ n such that (1) holds by utilizing the private key.
Therefore, the new non-MDS hash can be resistant to the birthday attack, and at present, its security is nearly the O(2 m ) magnitude, but not O(2 m / 2 ).
Compression Algorithm Is Resistant to Meet-in-the-middle Attack
Meet-in-the-middle dichotomy used for attack on an intended expansion of a block cipher was first developed by Diffie and Hellman in 1977 [31] . Section 3.10 of [9] brings forth a meet-in-the-middle attack algorithm for solving a subset sum problem.
INPUT ).
in the ASPP, where ¬ḇ i is the bit long-shadow of ¬b i , which implies there does not exist an easy relation between the ASPP ḏ ≡ ∏ n i=1 C i ḇ i (% M) and the dichotomy.
Compression Algorithm Is Resistant to Multi-block Differential Attack
The [32] and [33] show that multi-block near differential attack is effective on the iterative hash functions MD5, SHA-0, SHA-1, and SHA-256 which have multiple block-inputs and the MerkleDamgård-Iteration structure [7] [8] .
It is well known that MD5, SHA-0, or SHA-1 will execute a number of rounds of inner iteration for each input block, and each round of the inner iteration consists of linear arithmetics and logic operators such as addition, shift, exclusive or etc.
The input of the new non-MDS hash function is a short message which may be treated as only one block. Its inner iteration consists of at most 2n modular multiplications which is nonlinear and intricate, which indicates that the differential analysis of
Furthermore, in the new non-MDS hash, the inner nonlinear iteration leads to the fierce snowslide effect and strong noninvertibility (see Section 4.4.1), and makes it impossible to derive a set of sufficient conditions which ensure that the collision differential characteristics hold for two short messages which are expected to produce a collision.
Therefore, the new non-MDS hash is substantially distinct from the classical hashes MD5, SHA-0, SHA-1 etc, and the multi-block near differential attack suitable for the classical hashes will be utterly ineffective on the new non-MDS hash function.
Compression Algorithm Is Strongly Collision-free
Firstly, it is known from Section 4.4.2 that the new non-MDS hash function lĥ is weakly collision-free.
Secondly, for any arbitrary short message b 1 …b n , if want to find another short message b′ 1 …b′ n such that lĥ(b 1 …b n ) = lĥ(b′ 1 …b′ n ), adversaries must take
and further acquire the bit string b′ 1 …b′ n . It is known from Section 4.4.2 that such a collision problem is computationally harder than IFP at present. Thirdly, the new non-MDS hash is resistant to classical or efficient attacks in common use -the birthday attack, meet-in-the-middle attack, and multi-block differential attack for example.
Lastly, any subexponential time algorithm for solving the
is not found yet [34] , and the most efficient method of solving 
Proof:
According to Definition 3，it is easy to understand that for every ḇ i , there is 0 ≤ ḇ i ≤ n. Let b 1 …b n ≠ b′ 1 …b′ n ≠ 0 be two arbitrary bit strings, ḇ 1 …ḇ n and ḇ′ 1 …ḇ′ n be respectively two corresponding bit long-shadow strings.
Again let  i = ḇ i − ḇ′ i , and then there is
, n] has no subexponential time solution [34] , and is only faced with brute force attack.
is a found collision between two arbitrary bit strings b 1 …b n and b′ 1 …b′ n in subexponential time.
.
can be solved efficiently in subexponential time. It is in direct contradiction to the fact. Therefore, the new non-MDS hash function is strongly collision-free.
Applicability of the New Non-MDS Hash Function
The new non-MDS hash function may be applied in practice, which can be seen from three aspects.
Running Time of the Compression Algorithm
Suppose that running time is measured in the number of bit operations. Then it is easy to understand that the running time of a modular multiplication is O(2 lg 2 M) bit operations. The initialization algorithm in Section 3.1 is one-shot, and not real-time, and thus it is unnecessary to care about its running time.
In what follows, we consider the running time of the compression algorithm in Section 3.2. Because of n ≤ ∑ n i=1 ḇ i ≤ 2n for a nonzero bit string b 1 …b n , the compression algorithm takes at most 2n modular multiplications, namely the running time of the compression algorithm is O((2n)2 lg 2 M) = O(4n m 2 ) bit operations which is relatively small.
Comparison with the Chaum-Heijst-Pfitzmann Hash
The Chaum-Heijst-Pfitzmann hash function is provably secure, and defined as follows [16] : Provable security On the assumption that the DLP has a subexponential time solution, the Chaum-Heijst-Pfitzmann hash function is proved to be strongly collision-free in subexponential time.
Likewise, on the assumption that the ASPP has an exponential time solution, the new non-MDS hash function is also proved to be strongly collision-free in exponential time.
In summary, the new non-MDS hash has some advantages over the Chaum-Heijst-Pfitzmann one, and relatively the former may be regarded as lightweight.
Reformation of a Classical Hash Function
Because the new non-MDS hash function is resistant to birthday attack and meet-in-the-middle attack, a classical hash function of which the output is m bits, and the security is intended to be the O(2 m / 2 ) magnitude may be reformed into a compact hash function of which the output is m / 2 bits, and the security is still equivalent to the O(2 m / 2 ) magnitude [35] . For example, let b 1 …b 128 be the output of MD5 [36] , ḇ 1 …ḇ 128 be its bit long-shadow string, and lg M = 64. Then, regard ḏ = ∏ The above two examples indicate that we may exchange time for space when the related security remains unchanged.
Conclusion
In the paper, the authors propose a new non-MDS hash function which contains the initialization algorithm and the compression algorithm, and converts a short message or a message digest of n bits into a string of m bits, where 80 ≤ m ≤ 232 and 80 ≤ m ≤ n ≤ 4096.
The authors prove that both the MPP and the ASPP are computationally at least equivalent to the DLP in the same prime field, and analyze the security of the new non-MDS hash function. The analysis shows that the new non-MDS hash is computationally one-way, weakly collision-free, and strongly collision-free. Moreover, at present, any subexponential time algorithm for attacking the new non-MDS hash is not found, and its security gets be the O(2 m ) magnitude. Especially, the analysis illustrates that the new non-MDS hash function is resistant to birthday attack and meet-in-the-middle attack. By utilizing this characteristic, one can reform a classical hash function with an m-bit output and an O(2 m / 2 ) magnitude security into a compact hash function with an m / 2 bit output and the equivalent security.
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